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Technological innovation is key to enable future space exploration missions. Technology development, however, 
is not only driven by performance and resource considerations, but also by a broad range of directly or loosely 
interconnected factors. These include, among others, strategy, policy and politics at various levels, tactics and 
programmatics, interactions between stakeholders, resource requirements, performance goals from component to 
system level, mission infusion targets, portfolio execution and tracking, and technology push or mission pull. 
Furthermore, these influences occur on varying timescales and at diverse geographic locations. Such a complex and 
interconnected system could impede space technology innovation in the government environment. Hence, 
understanding the process through the Planning, Programming, Budget and Execution cycle could benefit strategic 
thinking, planning and execution. Insights could be gained through suitable models, for example assessing the key 
drivers against the framework of Wicked Problems. This paper discusses space technology innovation and innovation 
barriers in the government environment through the characteristics of Wicked Problems; that is, they do not have 
right or wrong solutions, only improved outcomes that can be reached through authoritative, competitive, or 
collaborative means. We will also augment the Wicked Problems model to account for the temporally and spatially 
coupled, and cyclical nature of this specific case, and propose how appropriate models could improve understanding 
of the key influencing factors and lead to reducing innovation barriers, subsequently stimulating technology 
innovation at NASA and other government-directed environments. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past 30 years in the US, more than 40 
studies pointed to a need for regular investments into 
new, transformative space technologies within NASA. 
These technologies are required to enable new class of 
NASA missions beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and to 
provide innovative solutions to dramatically improve 
technological capabilities for NASA and for the United 
States. There are a number of drivers associated with 
this recommendation. For example, the development of 
such technologies need to be affordable and reliable for 
space exploration. Government funded innovation 
activities are expected to span across the full scale of 
Technology Readiness Levels (TRL), starting at 
fundamental research and early stage innovation. At the 
fundamental research level the Agency needs to engage 
the brightest minds from academia to solve the difficult 
technology challenges faced by NASA’s space 
exploration missions. Furthermore, these technology 
development activities can be used to create new 
markets, while stimulating innovation for traditional and 
emerging aerospace businesses [NASA-STMD, 2014]. 
To understand the drivers influencing technology 
development, we need to look beyond performance and 
resource considerations, and examine a broader range of 
directly or loosely interconnected factors both inside 
and outside of NASA. These include, among others, 
strategy, policy and politics at various levels, tactics and 
programmatics, interactions between stakeholders, 
resource requirements, performance goals from 
component to system level, mission infusion targets, 
portfolio execution and tracking, and technology push 
or mission pull. In addition, the process and influencing 
factors for this dynamic system occur on varying 
timescales and at diverse geographic locations. Many of 
these factors are accounted for in the Planning, 
Programming, Budget and Execution (PPBE) process, 
which will be briefly discussed in our paper. 
The PPBE process is on the planning and execution 
side of the operations, and if not driven, influenced and 
supported by appropriate strategies, then such a 
complex and interconnected system could impede space 
technology innovation in the government environment. 
A good strategic approach includes three key elements: 
a diagnosis, a guiding policy, and a set of coherent 
actions. [Rumelt, 2011]. This paper contributes to the 
diagnosis part, by describing the technology 
development related interactions and influences 
between NASA and relevant external entities. 
Subsequently, these interfaces and related constraints 
will be discussed using the Wicked Problems model 
[Rittel & Webber, 1973]. In general, models are created 
through the reduction of complex systems to simple 
ones [Weinberg, 1991], and as George E.P. Box pointed 
it out, “essentially, all models are wrong, but some are 
useful” [Box & Draper, 1987]. Therefore, to draw 
m e a n i n g f u l c o n c l u s i o n s f r o m m o d e l s , t h e 
simplifications have to capture and weight all the key 
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influencing factors, and ignore those which have 
secondary effects on the modeled system. Such 
modeling is not trivial. As stated by Laurence J. Peter 
[Peter, 1982], “some problems are so complex that you 
have to be highly intelligent and well informed just to 
be undecided about them.” We hope that our 
simplifications will capture key elements of these 
complexities facing technology development activities, 
drivers and influences at NASA, and will help to 
elucidate the implementation challenges at hand. 
We will show that the Wicked Problems model is 
providing a reasonable framework for the case of 
NASA’s technology development activities. These 
problems do not have right or wrong solutions, only 
improved outcomes that can be reached through 
authoritative, competitive, or collaborative means. With 
appropriate strategies these problems could solve or at 
least reduce technology development barriers. To this 
end, we will further customize the model with 
additional rules to strengthen the construct for this 
particular case. Specifically, we will augment the 
Wicked Problems model to account for the temporally 
and spatially coupled, and cyclical nature of this case, to 
promote a better understanding, and subsequently 
stimulate technology innovation at NASA and other 
government-directed environments. 
I.I Wicked Problems 
The phrase “wicked problem" was first used in 
social planning to describe a problem, which does not 
have an obvious solution, due to changing requirements, 
and incomplete or contradictory bounding conditions. 
Furthermore, as a result of the often complex 
interdependencies, a chosen solution to a wicked 
problem could result in subsequent new problems. Rittel 
and Webber introduced 10 general rules to describe 
Wicked Problems [Rittel & Webber, 1973], which was 
synthesized and reduced to 6 general characteristics by 
Conklin [Conklin, 2006]. These are: 
1. The problem is not understood until after the 
formulation of a solution; 
2. Wicked problems have no stopping rules, difficult to 
know when the problem is solved or solution is 
reached; 
3. Solutions to wicked problems are not right or wrong; 
4. Every wicked problem is essentially novel and 
unique; 
5. Every solution to a wicked problem is a “one shot 
operation”; 
6. Wicked problems have no given alternative solutions. 
Wicked Problems are not simply too hard or 
complex, nor require additional considerations or have 
more stakeholders. In addition, the initial problem 
definition and the outcome are bi-directionally linked. 
The various stakeholders may have radically different 
perspectives, motivations, and drivers related to the 
issues. Therefore, the assessment of an optimal outcome 
is dependent on the perspective of the stakeholder, 
instead of considering it universally right. Because the 
initial problems and the related resource requirements 
are often ill defined, they are typically over-constrained, 
can’t be solved definitively through analytical thinking, 
and may require innovative solutions. 
Roberts identified three strategies to tackle wicked 
problems [Roberts, 2000]. Implementation of these 
strategies are influenced by management styles and 
institutional approaches. These are: 
1. Authoritative: This strategy places responsibility of 
solving problems to one or a few people. This is 
perceived to reduce the complexity of perspectives 
as competing views are being eliminated. The 
disadvantage is that key perspectives might be 
eliminated, or not appreciated, which may lead to 
less favorable outcomes. 
2. Competitive: This strategy brings opposing views 
against each other. It requires stakeholders to hold 
their views and propose their preferred solutions, so 
the different solutions could be compared and 
weighted. The disadvantage is the potential of 
creating confrontations and discouraging 
knowledge exchange . In tu rn th i s may 
disincentivize the stakeholders to propose solutions. 
3. Collaborative: This strategy involves all stakeholders 
working and converge towards a common best 
solution, agreed upon by all parties involved. 
NASA operates in a framework with a broad variety 
of stakeholders, where the associated problems and 
challenges go beyond a strictly rational, scientific and 
technical approach. As shown in Figure 1, NASA's 
stakeholders range from the top branches of the US 
Government to the project execution level both inside 
and outside of NASA, resulting in diverse perspectives, 
interests, and influences. 
I.II Design Thinking as Integrative Systems 
Thinking 
Space explora t ion in t roduces s igni f icant 
technological challenges, where incremental 
developments can fulfill near term needs, but future 
missions will require new alternatives and new ideas. 
Existing solutions are becoming obsolete and design 
thinking could provide a new approach to tackle these 
emerging problems. Design today is often viewed as a 
discipline focusing on aesthetics, image, and fashion. 
However, design accounts for more then simple 
ergonomics and packaging. Therefore, we should focus 
less on the resulting artifacts and more on the approach 
to achieve the desired goal. This design thinking 
approach allows us to address challenges through 
transformational innovations. Design thinking begins 
with integrative thinking to exploit opposing ideas and 
opposing constraints, and to create new solutions. In the 
case of design that means balancing desirability (what 
humans need), (technical) feasibility, and (economic) 
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viability [Martin, 2009]. The design and creation of new 
artifacts and processes can benefit from design thinking 
and systems thinking, through a combination of 
observational research, brainstorming for new solutions, 
and rapid prototyping. This strategy starts with a human 
centered approach (usability), while also integrating 
technology (feasibility) and economics (viability) 
[Balint, 2013]. Design thinking also looks at a broad 
range of considerations, including the understanding of 
culture, aspirations, motivations and context, at every 
level contributing to the framework. This approach can 
be beneficial to derive strategies in the government 
framework, where multiple stakeholders have diverse 
sets of drivers and expectations. 
Design thinking requires learning by making, and 
building in order to think. In effect, it often builds on 
tacit knowledge [Polanyi, 2009], which uses prototypes 
to speed up the process of innovation, because creating 
them will allow the practitioner to understand the 
strengths and weaknesses of the artifact or the process 
being designed. Faster turnaround results in faster 
evolution of ideas, which can result in better outcomes 
while saving resources. Socializing prototypes also 
results in an inclusion of stakeholders at an early stage, 
and encourage feedback for faster iteration, acceptance, 
and dispersion of the new technology. This is in line 
with the collaborative approach of solving wicked 
problems. 
Design thinking is important for the development of 
transformational technologies. Instead of the current 
linear way of making the best choice out of available 
alternatives, it encourages us to take a divergent 
approach, create new options, explore new alternatives, 
find new solutions and new ideas, that didn’t exist 
before. The process and use of divergence and 
convergence cycles, and their application for technology 
development at NASA are discussed in [Balint, 2013]. 
Good design, may it be a process, an artifact, or 
service, can provide distinct advantages over purely 
technology driven developments, because of its multi-
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disciplinary nature. Its transformative characteristics 
involve four major elements [Norman & Klemmner, 
2014], namely: 
• Design Thinking: to identify and solve the right 
problem; 
• Systems Thinking: to account for the crosscutting 
multiple disciplines; 
• Integrative: where both design theory and practice 
are accounted for; and 
• Human-Centered Design: to assure harmonious 
synergies between the user and technology. 
II. NASA IN THE GOVERNMENT 
FRAMEWORK 
Technology development at NASA is influenced by 
a broad range of factors, beyond Agency needs, 
technical performance, project and program resource 
requirements. In oder to demonstrate why we consider 
technology development at NASA a wicked problem, 
we need a better understanding of the budget 
breakdown, the budgetary process, and influencing 
drivers within this broader framework. 
II.I NASA’s Budget 
NASA’s annual budget is part of the United States 
federal budget, which funds government operations for 
a given fiscal year. The U.S. Government Budget begins 
as the President's Budget Request (PBR) from the 
Executive Branch, to the U.S. Congress under the 
Legislative Branch. In the PBR, the President 
recommends funding levels for the next fiscal year. The 
fiscal year begins on October 1, and ends on September 
30 of the following year. The PBR is not the final 
budget for the government agencies. By law, the budget 
is appropriated by Congress on an annual basis. 
Congressional decisions are set by budget committees, 
identifying spending limits, which are subsequently 
approved by appropriation subcommittees to allocate 
funding to the various federal agencies and programs. 
The funding bill is then passed by both the House of 
Senate and the House of Representatives of the 
Congress, and sent to the President of the United States 
(POTUS) for signature. In this paper we give a notional 
and simplified explanation of the process, as the 
appropriation bill may come in other formats, including 
an omnibus spending bill, a continuing resolution (CR), 
or a supplemental appropriation bill. It can also be 
impacted by other spending measures, such as the 
sequestration process. Further details on the NASA 
relevant budgeting process is discussed in the following 
sub-section, describing the Programing, Planning, 
Budget and Execution (PPBE) process. 
However, it is important to relate the size of NASA’s 
budget to the overall federal budget, as it provides an 
indication on the perceived importance and relevance of 
this government agency compared to other entities. We 
will demonstrate this through the U.S. Federal Budget 
breakdown from the Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 [HoR, 
2014], shown in Figure 2. The total spending amounted 
to $3.45 trillion, which included mandatory and 
discretionally spending elements. Spending for 
mandatory programs cannot be reduced, and it includes 
paying the interest on the national deficit, and covers the 
major entitlement programs, such as medicare, 
medicaid, and social security. Discretionary spending 
can theoretically reduced to zero by Congress, based on 
Constitutional law. It includes both defense and non-
defense related spending. NASA falls under the non-
defense related spending category and its budget can 
fluctuate year after year. In FY2013 NASA’s 
appropriated budget was $16.865 billion, which is 2.7% 
of the non-defense based discretionary funding, and 
0.49% of the total federal budget. In comparison, during 
that Apollo era, NASA’s budget amounted to about 
4.4% of the national budget, which was about 9 times 
higher than the current level. 
Further breakdown of NASA’s FY2013 budget 
shows a mixed distribution between the 4 mission 
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directorates [NASA, 2014] - see Figure 3. The enacted 
budget for the Science was $4.782B; for Aeronautics 
Research $530M; for Space Technology $615M; for 
Human Exploration $7.43B; with further allocation for 
Education ($116M); Construction and Environmental 
Compliance and Restoration ($647M); and Cross 
Agency Support for NASA-wide management and 
operations support ($2.711B). While these numbers may 
look reasonably large compared to other national space 
agencies, the allocations are further divided by Mission 
Directorate Divisions, Programs and Projects. The 
appropriated budget includes a large number of 
mandatory spending allocations as well, for example, 
funding continuing development of the Orion Multi-
Purpose Crew Vehicle, Space Launch System (SLS), 
and the Exploration Ground Systems (EGS) under 
Human Exploration, or the James Webb Space 
Telescope under Science. Additional details on the 
budget breakdown is provided in [NASA, 2014]. 
The main purpose of the above discussion was to 
demonstrate the complexities and constraints associated 
with NASA’s budget, and to illustrate how budget 
uncertainties could have a significant impact on the 
initial science, exploration and technology plans. 
II.II PPBE Process 
NASA’s annual budget is part of the U.S. Federal 
budget and negotiated through the Planning, 
Programing, Budget and Execution (PPBE) process, 
which focuses on financial management and resource 
allocation for current and future acquisition programs. 
While the budget is set for a given fiscal year, the PPBE 
process bridges an approximately 3 years fiscal time 
period. 
The PPBE process consists of four distinct phases, 
which are carried out in parallel. These are: 
• Planning: this phase is designed to define content 
and examine alternative strategies, analyze trends and 
changing conditions, needs for new technologies, 
threats, and to provide an economic assessment of 
potential outcomes from new options, and projected 
long-term outcomes of current choices. If not done 
correctly, it may revert to a simple forward projection 
of current activities, leaving out the strategic 
assessment of alternatives. While on a short term this 
latter approach may indicate a firm direction, on the 
longer term it can harm the organization. 
• Programming: this phase connects the planning 
elements with their multi-year resource implications, 
and evaluates various tradeoff options. When planning 
and programming are performed concurrently, with a 
focus on forward planning only, there is a danger of 
describing a broader yet linearly projected future, 
instead of providing trades and alternatives.  
• Budgeting: this phase addresses the formulation, 
justification, execution, and control of the budget for 
the following year. It is formulated to align with both 
national and Agency needs and requirements to 
achieve the set out plans. 
• Execution: this phase represents the actual 
implementation of the process, where the budget is 
spent in the current fiscal year, according to plans 
defined through the previous phases. In a typical 
PPBE cycle the budget is appropriated on time at the 
beginning of the fiscal year, and the program is 
executed accordingly. However, appropriation delays 
and other factors may result in resource allocation 
changes throughout the year, which could introduce 
budget uncertainties, focus creep, and may negatively 
impact the planned execution. 
The idealized PPBE process is shown in Figure 4. 
Idealized, because it assumes a predictable theoretical 
cadence of the steps and actions. In practice a number of 
uncertainties can have significant impacts on carrying 
out this plan. For example, reoccurring delays related to 
annual budget appropriations result in so called 
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continuing resolutions (CR), which may take from 
months to even a full fiscal year to resolve. In turn, CR 
has an impact on funding and resource allocation, 
project execution, descopes, delays, and even new 
content initiation in a given fiscal year. 
Planning and programming is performed through 
interfaces between three key stakeholders. The activity 
is led by NASA HQ as a focal point, first interacting 
with NASA centers regarding resource allocation plans 
and needs in support of the planned content, and 
following a briefing to the NASA Administrator, the 
budget and related content plans are sent to the 
Government’s Executive Branch for assessment against 
national funding plans, strategies and policy alignments. 
This process starts about a year and a half in advance of 
budget appropriation. This phase completes with the 
“Passback” step, where the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) under the Executive Branch provides 
actionable feedback on the submitted plans. It occurs 
less than a year before budget appropriation. In addition 
to OMB, NASA is also coordinating with the Office of 
Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) under the 
Executive Branch, to align with national strategies and 
policies. 
The budgeting phase involves three stakeholders. 
NASA, and both the Executive and Legislative 
Branches of the US Government. After receiving the 
“Passback” from OMB, NASA HQ makes the necessary 
adjustments to the plan, and compiles the President’s 
Budget Request (PBR) document, which is also called 
Congressional Justification (CJ). The updates are made 
following discussions with the NASA Centers, in order 
to optimize - within constraints identified in the 
“Passback” - for common goals and targeted outcomes. 
The PBR document is sent to Congress in the middle of 
the fiscal year. Within Congress, four entities are set to 
assess the PBR document, namely the authorization and 
appropriation sides of the Senate and the House of 
Representatives. The budget - to be appropriated - 
requires an agreement between the Senate and the 
House of Representatives before signed by the President 
and passed into law. 
Once appropriated, NASA receives the budget with 
markups from the Congress, and proceeds with the 
execution. This markup often includes earmarks and 
other changes, in addition to modifications to the final 
budget, which is often lower than recommended in the 
PBR. This can result in a flurry of re-planning activities 
within NASA, including the assessment of the impacts 
on various projects, and modifications to the milestones 
and deliverables. The mismatch between the PBR plans 
and the appropriated budget plans translates to changes 
to the programs and projects, which may vary from 
minor impacts to significant or complete redirections. If 
the budget is not appropriated on time, which has been 
the case for most years over the past decade, then the 
projects are forced to execute under the assumption of 
the previous year’s budget allocation. If the subsequent 
appropriated budget is lower than that for the previous 
year, projects can be significantly impacted and often 
harmed for the rest of the fiscal year and beyond. 
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The PPBE process is cyclical, with annual cycles 
and associated uncertainties. Consequently, planning 
and execution is often becomes a challenging exercise, 
putting significant pressure on all of the parties 
involved, from the Mission Directorate level at NASA 
HQ down to the project execution level. In this domino 
effect, project resource changes can also propagate to 
external contractors, thus impacting space related 
industries, small companies, and academic institutions. 
II.III Influencing Drivers 
Technology development and related innovation at 
NASA are influenced by both direct and indirect 
drivers. This includes the highest branches of the US 
federal government, NASA’s organizational structure 
from Headquarters to NASA Centers, and external 
entities from the National Research Council, to 
academia, industry, and Other Government Agencies 
(OGA). We are discussing the influencing elements 
from a top down hierarchy, shown in Figure 1. Many of 
the influencing factors listed here are further detailed in 
[Balint, 2013]. 
II.III.I US Federal Government  
At the highest level, two branches of the US 
government are involved, namely the Executive and 
Legislative branches. The third, Judicial branch, does 
not have an active role on the day to day activities of 
NASA. The Executive Branch under the President of the 
United States (POTUS) has two offices which are 
working with NASA on the budgetary process and 
setting strategic directions. The former is the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), where the Science 
and Space Branch is embedded in the fourth level under 
the Resource Management Offices, the National 
Resource Programs, and the Energy Science and Water 
Division. Similarly, for the latter one, for the Space and 
Aeronautics Branch is positioned under the Advisors of 
Policy, then the Office of Science and Technology 
Policy (OSTP), and Technology and Innovation 
Division. OMB is concerned with the planning of the 
overall annual national budget, where NASA’s budget is 
below 0.5% (compared to the 4.4% during the Apollo 
era). Its perceived importance at this level is often 
aligned with the allocated budget. OSTP is driven by 
national level interests, where STEM (Science, 
Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) education, 
national and international prestige and leadership are 
important factors. One possible way to achieve some of 
the national goals are through space exploration, but it is 
not the only path. NASA’s alignment with national 
initiatives, for example with the National Robotic 
Initiative, Material Genomes Initiative, National 
Nanotechnology Initiative, and Manufacturing 
Innovation are also important drivers. Consequently, the 
considerations about NASA’s importance within the 
overall national level strategic and political framework 
and related resource allocation portion from the national 
budget are weighted accordingly. The 4-year 
presidential election cycle also influences presidential 
priorities and related decision making, primarily 
focusing on other higher priority national interest from 
health care to national security, thus keeping decisions 
related to NASA on a flat and continuous trajectory. 
Regularly pointing to the fact that NASA’s budget is 
still higher than that of the combined budget other 
national space agencies, and the politically driven space 
race is over, the drivers to increase the budget are not 
strong. Still, the annual President’s Budget Request 
shows an increasing budget trend, which typically does 
not materialize during the appropriation process by 
Congress. The Legislative Branch is represented by the 
Congress, and includes the Senate, with two senators 
per state, and the House of Representatives with one 
representative for every 13,000 people. Both has their 
authorization and appropriation committees, responsible 
for advancing the PPBE process, and appropriating the 
budget. Within the Congress the drivers are often 
different from those for OMB and OSTP. Priorities 
include resource allocation to specific states, 
championed by state representatives on appropriation 
committees. Related earmarks in the appropriated 
budget often identify specific high budget projects, 
linked to specific states, thus creating jobs and 
stimulating local economies. Earmarks, combined with 
budget cuts, frequently overwrite the set directions 
described in the President’s Budget Request, and 
constrain NASA’s ability to allocate resources and start 
new projects recommended by the nation’s leading 
scientists and technologists. At times the Executive and 
Legislative Branches, and within the Congress the 
Senate and the House of Representative align, and at 
other times seem to act as obstructionists. These 
dynamics can also have an impact on the budget 
appropriation outcomes. Furthermore, NASA’s annual 
budget is effected by multiple overlapping temporal and 
spatial cycles, related to elections and the regional 
impact of changing representatives on committees, 
influencing budget appropriation. 
II.III.II National Research Council 
Recommendations for exploration target through 
either human or robotic exploration are supported by 
studies by the National Research Council. These studies 
are used by NASA as guiding documents. The NRC is 
an independent body, bringing together the Nation’s 
most respected scientists, engineers, technologists and 
researchers. Through decadal surveys, technology 
roadmap studies, and targeted reports, the NRC provides 
guidance to NASA on priorities about future missions 
and technology development needs. These are used by 
NASA during the PPBE phases, when discussing future 
strategic content both within the Agency and with the 
government. The NRC also provides independent direct 
input to the government’s side during these budgetary 
negotiations. 
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II.III.III NASA 
Agency level strategic and programmatic 
coordinations and oversight at the ten NASA Centers 
are performed from NASA Headquarters. In effect, the 
role of NASA HQ is to provide the primary interface 
between the Government and the Centers, plan, prepare, 
and negotiate NASA’s annual budget (with inputs from 
the Centers on workforce and resource allocation 
needs), and subsequently distribute appropriate 
resources to the performers. HQ is also responsible for 
Agency and Mission Directorate level (Level 1) 
strategic decision making, execution oversight, setting 
and enforcing procedural requirements, portfolio 
assessment, balancing and planning based on strategic 
considerations, oversight of roadmapping and design 
reference mission planning activities, communications, 
and interfacing with stakeholders inside and outside of 
NASA. Collaboration and alignment between the four 
Mission Directorates is coordinated at the HQ level. 
External stakeholders, from industry, academia, and 
other government agencies are approached to discuss 
strategic collaborations and future project ideas. 
International collaboration is desired, but ITAR 
regulations can make the arrangement non-trivial. HQ 
also runs solicitations through a competitive process, or 
authoritatively directs projects to performers. Beside the 
procedural influences, organizational structures can 
impact operating modes and outcomes, and we can’t 
expect different results and efficiencies from 
organizations if the setups are identical. As stated by 
Marshall McLuhan, “we become what we behold," that 
"we shape our tools, and thereafter our tools shape us.” 
Personalities at every level play important roles at 
workplaces. Leadership styles could vary from 
collaborative to authoritative, and skills can differ 
greatly, influencing workplace dynamics, program and 
project outcomes, and the overall success of the 
organization. Typically NASA Centers house the Level 
2 Program Offices. These offices are the interface 
between Level 1 and the Projects at Level 3. Centers 
work within their own organizational structures, 
managing their workforce and active project, which is 
often challenging due to budget uncertainties. Re-
planning at the program and project level is a frequent 
activity, with impacts to project execution and 
deliverables. Budget uncertainties and reduction can 
introduce stress points between the various centers with 
somewhat overlapping capabilities, competing for the 
same funding. The geographic distribution of the ten 
NASA Centers can introduce complexities to 
collaborations on distributed project. 
II.III.IV Other Government Agencies 
Just like NASA, all government agencies receive 
funding from the federal government on an annual 
basis. Over the years, funding for most agencies were 
stagnant, stimulating collaborations on various projects, 
when the core competences and project goals 
sufficiently aligned. In a shrinking budgetary 
environment these consolidations can provide short term 
success, but gradually making them not viable. “You 
can’t shrink your way to greatness.” [Peters, 1997] 
II.III.V Academia 
The primary product of universities is knowledge, 
which is transmitted to the stakeholders. They are well 
suited for early stage technology development through 
grants and other types of awards. Ensuring funding 
continuation through budget uncertainties could 
represents challenges for NASA. 
II.III.VI Industry 
NASA works with the industrial base, ranging from 
small to large companies with strong funding 
dependencies from the government. Aerospace 
companies, focusing on space related technology 
development can be impacted by limited and uncertain 
budget appropriations. Maintaining core competence at 
these companies can be important for the future of the 
Agency, but decreasing or stagnant budgets could 
reduce the number of solicitations for new technologies, 
and the number of awards to be handed out. Further 
complications for NASA can rise when dissatisfied 
companies attempt to force alternative approaches, by 
appealing to their congressional representatives in 
support of leveraging a more favorable response from 
the Agency.  
From the long list it is clear that the number of 
influencing factors impacting technology development 
at NASA range well beyond a purely technological 
feasibility, resource related viability, and Agency or 
national needs.  
III. DISCUSSIONS 
A better understanding of the complexities discussed 
above allows us to make well informed strategic 
decisions.  
III.I Why is this a wicked problem? 
Looking at the six characteristics of wicked 
problems [Conklin, 2006] (and referring to them as 
WPC1 to 6), we find the following.  
• WPC1: For NASA - and for all government 
agencies - the annual budget is unknown until it is 
appropriated. The appropriation at the beginning of 
the fiscal year is far from certain, and can stretch 
through the full fiscal year. Regularly included 
earmarks and changing content from the PBR 
introduce further uncertainties. Once the appropriation 
is done, NASA HQ updates the plans and allocates 
resources in the best suitable way. 
• WPC2: Project may encounter difficulties due to 
changing resource allocations, and further 
interventions are needed to resolve these issues. 
• WPC3: Operating in a resource limited 
environment, strategic decisions are needed on a 
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number of issues, focusing on subsets of the problem, 
which can be addressed under the circumstances. For 
example, program execution can target short or long 
t e r m t e c h n o l o g y n e e d s , i n c r e m e n t a l o r 
transformational technology developments, or a 
mixture of them. Any of these approaches can be 
justified and may lead to success or failure as 
propagated to the future. 
• WPC4: NASA’s technology portfolio is changing 
continuously, with projects being completed and new 
projects starting. Program resources are influenced by 
budget allocation uncertainties year after year. While 
past experiences may help to resolve these issues, 
every year a new set of variables are introduced, 
making the problems at hand always novel and 
unique. 
• WPC5: Once the budget is appropriated, NASA 
HQ responds to allocate the needed resources to the 
performers. This has to be done swiftly to limit 
negative impacts to the programs and projects. Once 
the resources are allocated, the projects are 
responsible to perform at the expected level. Pushing 
technology boundaries can result in project overruns, 
requiring additional resources at any time of the year, 
complicating the process and introducing stress 
points. 
• WPC6: NASA’s resources are constrained and 
uncertain within bounds. Project risks can be 
mitigated through reserves to a point, but the 
continuous interplay between the full portfolio of 
projects and their uncertainties, constrained by a 
limited budget makes the outcomes unique. Driven by 
strategic decisions, some project might be impacted 
more than others, without alternative solutions. 
III.II Cyclicality, Temporality, and Spatiality 
Based on the discussions above, we can further 
refine the Wicked Problems model for NASA, to 
account for its temporally and spatially coupled cyclical 
nature. We have identified cyclicality due to the annual 
budget appropriation cycle, governmental mid-term 
elections in every two years, and presidential elections 
every four years. Furthermore, some of the technologies 
may take a decade to develop, which introduces an 
additional layer of an even longer timeframe. The 
annual budget cycle often introduces resource-related 
uncertainties, driven by appropriated budget levels and 
time delays. When the budget is not appropriated by the 
first day of the fiscal year, the Agency operates under 
Continuing Resolution (CR) guidelines, when new 
project cannot be started, and spending is held at the 
level of the previous fiscal year. An extended length of 
the CR (and other compounding factors, such as 
sequestration) may also lead to continuous re-planning 
cycles, resource reduction to the projects, or at times to 
rush spending at the end of the fiscal year. In addition, 
appropriated budgets are frequently lower from the PBR 
amount, requiring further re-planning activities. The 
national election cycles contribute to the temporality of 
the Wicked Problem. At mid-term elections new House 
of Representatives and Delegates can be elected for 
two-year terms, and new Senators for six-year terms. 
Some are re-elected, but even partial turnovers in 
committee membership can change the voting balance, 
and influence appropriation outcomes when combined 
with the dynamics of national politics, and perceived 
national budgetary priorities. NASA’s budget is below 
0.5% of the national budget and it is in the discretionary 
funding category, which means that it can be adjusted 
based on other national or regional priorities. Thus, the 
appropriated budget can include earmarks, which are 
specified changes or added constraints to the PBR. 
These earmarks are often spatially aligned with the 
Congressmen’s regional interests to bring resources to 
their home states. Depending on local economies, the 
importance of space related investment and jobs vary 
between states, translating to earmark-based resource 
distributions. Depending on the balance between 
congressional party affiliations, and that of the President 
(elected every four years), the appropriation committees 
could either support, oppose, and/or modify the PBR. 
All of these can result in budgetary uncertainties and 
instabilities for NASA’s appropriation process and 
outcomes, including continuous re-planning cycles, 
project de-scopes, delayed milestones and missed 
deliverables. These have a significant impact on 
technology development and related strategies. 
Consequently, we have extended Rittel and Webber’s 
model [Rittel & Webber, 1973] and termed it: NASA’s 
temporally and spatially coupled cyclical Wicked 
Problem. Understanding the influences to this Wicked 
Problem at various levels could help identifying areas 
where design, design thinking, designerly thinking 
could be leveraged for strategic decision making at both 
micro scales (for project and programs) and macro 
scales (for mission directorates and the Agency). 
III.III Strategic Considerations 
As an example, NASA’s Office of the Chief 
Technologist was established 4 years ago, after 
identifying the need for a protected and self contained 
entity focusing on the development of future 
transformational space technologies for the Agency and 
the Nation. The office was envisioned with an annual 
budget of 1 billion dollars, and a matching workforce of 
about 900 civil servants. In 2013 the Office was divided 
into a small office for the Chief Technologist, 
addressing Agency-wide policies and strategies, while 
the majority of the resources was allocated to the Space 
Technology Mission Directorate. However, the initially 
requested annual funding level never materialized, and 
after these years it is about $576M in FY14, yet with 
approximately the same original civil servant 
complement, which is overly high for the current 
funding level. This limits procurement for competed 
new technology projects, and requires hard choices 
about how resources are allocated. For this type of 
organization a desired portfolio balance would include 
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p r o j e c t s t a rg e t i n g b o t h e x p l o r a t i o n a l ( o r 
transformational) and exploitational (or incremental) 
technologies. The former would open up new 
approaches for the next generation of missions, while 
the latter would support existing near term stakeholder 
needs both within the Agency and for the nation. 
However, the constraints may require to assess original 
assumptions, reflect current performance, and seek out 
new opportunities and threats, and by asking questions 
along the line of: 
• Is the current portfolio addresses the appropriate 
needs?  
• Is the organization developing the right 
technologies, to the right stakeholders, for the right 
infusion timeframe? 
• Can the budget support funding all technology 
areas identified in the Space Technology Roadmap? If 
not, where should the focus be? 
• Can the budget support developments across all 
Technology Readiness Levels, from early stage to 
flight development? 
• Can the budget support technology development 
both inside and outside of NASA? 
• Should the investment be near term focused with 
incremental technologies, or far term focused with 
more transformational technologies? What is the right 
balance between the two types of investments? 
• How to infuse new transformational technologies 
into stakeholder needs? 
• How to deal with non-performing projects? Would 
cancellation be warranted to free up resources? 
• How to best communicate strategies, related to 
technology development activit ies, to key 
stakeholders and to the broad community? What is the 
best organizational structure to achieve a desired 
outcome? 
• How to customize the message to various 
stakeholders - e.g., at various levels from projects to 
the Agency, to the funding sources of the government, 
to external companies, to academia, and to the public - 
while being consistent yet maximizing the knowledge 
transfer? 
• How to motivate members of the organization, and 
how to leverage their talents? 
• What are the biggest challenges facing the 
organization? 
• What are the new opportunities and threats that 
strategies should consider, both short and long term? 
• How to overcome innovation barriers, including 
NASA’s risk-averse culture; low priority to 
innovation; short-term focus; instability; lack of 
opportunities; process overload; communication 
challenges; and organizational inertia? 
• How to leverage non-traditional approaches, that 
may not require significant investment yet could 
greatly enhance project performance, visibility, and 
awareness both inside and outside of the Agency? For 
example, NASA’s Advance Exploration Systems 
(AES) under HEOMD worked with the Topcoder 
community on NASA’s Asteroid Grand Challenge, 
leveraging the skills of the broad code developer 
community. AES also received 233,431 votes for the 
new Z-2 spacesuit outer shell design, in effect 
involving the public at virtually no cost to advertise 
the technology and design activities of that 
organization. These strategic approaches can provide 
added dimensions and resulting benefits to an 
organization by extending strategic thinking to 
multiple disciplines beyond linear project and 
program management lines and practices. 
Details and potential approaches to some of these 
questions can be found in [Balint, 2013]. 
III.IV Knowledge and Hierarchy 
In his book, Tacit Dimensions [Polanyi, 2009], 
Polanyi discussed tacit knowledge - opposed to explicit 
knowledge - which is hard to verbalize or transfer from 
one person to another. Some refer to it as “fast thinking” 
[Kahneman, 2013], or “gut feeling.” Tacit knowledge 
can be a great benefit for strategic decision making, as 
this interconnected set of underlying insights can signal 
plausible directions even before expressed properly. 
This knowledge can emerge through a hierarchy where 
the various levels interface, the same way as sound, 
words, sentences, and prose build on the top of each 
other. Through an analogy and redirection, this 
hierarchy system can be applied to organizations within 
NASA’s framework, building from Project and Program 
levels, to Mission Directorates, and subsequently to 
Agency and Government levels (see Figure 5). We 
consider Project and Program level activities as linear 
disciplines, driven by highly constrained and goal 
oriented practices. At these levels engineering and 
technology drivers address feasibility, while 
management practices, planning and execution 
processes deal with viability. The usability aspect, 
related to Agency or national needs, are driven by 
higher level strategic considerations. At the Mission 
Directorate, Agency and Government levels decision 
making is multi-disciplinary, involving future 
opportunities, threats, and a broad input from 
stakeholders, discussed above. The strategies are also 
hierarchy specific, and can be described as local, 
regional, and global, respectively. Influences and drivers 
vary at each level, and coupled through their interfaces 
(for example between project and program; program 
and directorate; and so on). In this hierarchical setup, a 
mismatch between the level and associated drivers can 
be detrimental to the organization. For example, if the 
Directorate level focuses too much on Program and 
Project oversight, it may impact the organization in 
multiple ways. It spends its resources away from 
strategic thinking, while forcing the Directorate to 
operate in a linear discipline mode. Subsequently this 
m a y l i m i t t h e o rg a n i z a t i o n ’s s u c c e s s a n d 
competi t iveness, especial ly if contemporary 
organizations simultaneously leverage their own 
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strategic advantages. Operating at a lower level also 
negates the effectiveness, roles and responsibilities of 
that level, which may propagate through the 
organization, resulting in reduced effectiveness and 
lower workplace morale. An organization that is based 
on planning an execution only, without strategy, feels 
functional, performing a significant amount of work, but 
at the same time may go down the wrong path, or spend 
efforts unnecessarily to cover all bases. For example, 
performing endless planning exercises instead of having 
a strategic understanding and narrow the trades to a 
small but meaningful number of scenarios. 
This hierarchy construct can also help to explain the 
Peter Principle [Peter, 1982], where the selection for a 
new position is based on the applicant’s performance in 
the current role, instead of the requirements of a new 
position. At higher levels linear disciplines, such as 
project management, and program management 
practices are replaced with strategic thinking, requiring 
a multi-disciplinary skill set. Strategy is vastly different 
from planning and execution, especially in engineering 
and technology fields, which are also considered linear 
disciplines. Strategy involves assessment and analysis 
of the situation, identifying options, then setting 
policies, and combining them with coherent actions 
[Rumelt, 2011]. Strategic leaders leverage tacit 
knowledge based on analysis and foresight of multi-
disciplinary future opportunities and threats, combined 
with reflections of the ongoing activities and 
constraints. Design thinking, systems thinking, and 
integrative thinking, including scenario prototyping can 
stimulate new ideas, resulting in an emergence of tacit 
knowledge to communicable knowledge, new options 
and strategic advantage. This could be further illustrated 
through Ashby’s law of requisite variety (see Figure 6). 
In order for a system to effectively control another, it 
must have at least as much variety as the system it is to 
control, otherwise the control is considered restrictive. 
As an example, we can look at a thermostat, with an on 
and off switch. If the temperature is too hot it switches 
off, and if it too cold, it switches on. The variety of the 
Regulator is 2 resulting in 2 states for the controlled 
(Figure 6.a). For a linear discipline field, such as 
engineering, the variety is tightly controlled, and the 
disturbance - or the problem to be solved - is filtered by 
the Regulator’s degree of variety, resulting in a well 
defined outcome (Figure 6.b). Figure 6.c shows a higher 
level of complexity, which could describe a strategic 
approach. Without a Regulator, the disturbance 
propagates through the uncontrolled state to an 
unchanged outcome. The Regulator imposes its variety 
to the system, which results options for the controlled 
set, propagating to an outcome. On one hand, if the 
Regulator maintains its limited variety, inherited from a 
linear discipline, the outcomes are over-constrained and 
controlled down to the same level as that for a linear 
discipline. While this system produces outcomes, the 
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Regulator might not be aware of variety imposed 
limitations, and the system under-performs and not 
competitive. If there is too little variety in the 
controlling system (Regulator), the control becomes 
restrictive, rather than facilitative. On the other hand, if 
the Regulator at the strategy level operates with a 
broadened variety, new options may emerge from the 
Disturbance, allowing the Regulator the select from a 
broader set and maximize the success of the outcome. 
Thus if we want proper enabling control - not restrictive 
- we must have sufficient variety. In other words, the 
approach that makes a manager successful in a linear 
discipline, is not sufficient to be successful at a strategic 
level. Without adjustment, the success of the 
organization can be adversely impacted. (The theorem 
of a good regulator was conceived by Roger C. Conant 
and W. Ross Ashby [Conant & Ashby, 1970], and 
considered central to cybernetics.) 
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we highlighted the complexities 
associated with NASA’s operational and budgetary 
framework in the government environment; accounted 
for a broad range of factors, drivers, and constraints at 
various levels of the organizational hierarchy. The 
model of Wicked Problems was found to be useful to 
describe these connections. Based on the findings, we 
have extended the Wicked Problems model by including 
key constraints relevant to NASA, and termed it: 
NASA’s temporally and spatially coupled cyclical 
Wicked Problem. 
Wicked Problems are solved through stakeholders, 
by identifying and negotiating goals, and actions to 
reach them. Such process of deliberation and 
argumentation is political. Consequently, technology 
development at NASA is political, beyond the scope of 
cost, schedule and performance drivers, and highly 
influenced by interactions with higher level 
stakeholders. External stakeholders often have different 
or loosely coupled drivers connecting to space 
exploration. 
We have demonstrated that the success and even the 
existence of projects and programs are often dependent 
on a large number of influencing factors and 
considerations beyond need (usability), technical 
feasibility, and fiscal viability. Grasping this framework 
beyond the bounds of NASA could help strategic 
decision making, especially in the problem diagnosis 
phase. It may also provide an insight for project and 
program managers, who are typically involved with 
only a subset of this framework. 
We have argued that the organizational hierarchy 
operates through linear disciplines at the project and 
program levels, and use local, regional, and global 
strategies at the Mission Directorate, Agency, and 
Government levels. The required managerial and 
leadership skill-sets differ between programmatic and 
strategic levels, influencing the operations and success 
of an organization. 
It is often asked: “why can’t NASA decide on an 
exploration target, may it be the Moon, Mars, an 
Asteroid or a Lagrangian Point?” This paper may 
provide the answer. It requires long term policy and 
strategy commitments from the government, supported 
by continuing funding for decades at a significantly 
higher level than NASA’s current budget allocation. For 
NASA, space exploration is driven by scientific and 
human exploration goals to answer questions about the 
origin and evolution of our universe, the origin and 
evolution of life in it, and identifying hazards and 
resources for humanity. For the government the science 
and exploration goals are overshadowed by national and 
international prestige, national priorities, election 
cycles, short term planning, party politics and other 
drivers. Without a clear commitment, NASA’s best 
choice is to work on evolvable plans with common 
underlying technologies and mission architectures, 
which advance the state of the art, and can be ready on 
short notice, as soon as an appropriate level of 
commitment and long term funding support is provided 
by the government. 
V. FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Problem definition comes from a specific point of 
view, and defining the problem inherently defines the 
solution. Over-constrained problem definition leads to 
incremental advancements, but not to innovation. Future 
space exploration missions are highly reliant on 
transformational space technologies and linked mission 
architectures. How to overcome this gap? Approaching 
technology development throughout the eyes of a design 
thinker can be an answer. Design is a creative approach 
to problem solving with the power to tackle complex 
multi-disciplinary and pressing social issues. In 
comparison, linear disciplines, like engineering, tend to 
downplay the benefits of design. This might be true at 
the linear project and program levels, but strategy 
needs design and design needs strategic considerations. 
Successful strategies build on design thinking, systems 
thinking, and integrative thinking, and can help to 
overcome NASA’s innovation barriers.  
Today’s most innovative technology companies 
utilize the combination of 1) design thinking, to identify 
and solve the correct problem; 2) systems thinking, to 
address the multi-disciplinary nature of the problem; 3) 
integrative design, where practice and theory are 
blended; and 4) human-centered design, where the users 
work synergistically with the technology. For these 
companies, Design is not limited to engineering and 
business, but used and an all-encompassing approach, 
which also includes social sciences and the arts. NASA 
could benefit from these approaches. 
Design thinking is typically practice based, and 
closely aligned with the management framework. In 
comparison, design practice and theory is described 
through designerly thinking. [Johansson-Sköldberg, et 
al., 2013]. In the next phase of this research, we will 
build on NASA’s Wicked Problem framework, 
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described in this paper and on the innovation framework 
in the government environment, discussed in [Balint, 
2013]. We will assess the benefits, applicability, and 
potential implementation approaches of design thinking 
and designerly thinking within NASA, and potentially at 
other national space agencies. The assessment will 
include their applicability for strategic decision making 
and sense making; for communication and knowledge 
transfer; for interdisciplinary design processes (e.g., for 
mission architectures, and systems thinking); for 
creating and improving design spaces (e.g., innovation 
foundries, creative spaces, maker labs); for artifact 
creation (e.g., innovative technology development, and 
sense giving); and for organizational and management 
design. 
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